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Abstract
I consider the relation of explanations for the observed data to testa-
bility in the following contexts: observational and experimental detection
of dark matter; observational and experimental detection of dark energy
or a cosmological constant Λ; observational or experimental testing of the
multiverse proposal to explain a small non-zero value of Λ; and observa-
tional testing of the possibility of large scale spatial inhomogeneity with
zero Λ.
1 Dark matter and testability
As discussed at this meeting, there is a great deal of astronomical evidence
for dark matter: galaxy rotation curves and dynamical studies; the Baryon
Acoustic Oscillations (BAO) and peaks in the Cosmic Blackbody Radiation
(CBR) power spectrum; and other studies of Large Scale Structure (LSS). An
important feature of this story is that dark matter was (somewhat reluctantly)
observationally discovered, it was not predicted! However its nature is unknown,
except that it is not baryonic, so there is much theoretical speculation about
what it is.
As to the astronomical evidence, there is more coming, with many studies
under way and detectors planned. Laboratory and accelerator tests are also
planned, attempting to link astrophysics to detected particle properties. This
will be a major coup if successful - it will identify dark matter physically. Ac-
companying this experimental work is a continuing development of different
theories about the nature of dark matter, as evidenced at this meeting.
All this work is very much in the proper scientific spirit: make theories and
test observationally and experimentally. Dark matter searches and tests are
thriving, and I will not comment more on them here.
∗Paper for CRAL-IPNL conference ”Dark Energy and Dark Matter”, Lyon 2008.
†Mathematics Department, University of Cape Town.
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2 The Acceleration of the universe
The case of dark energy is quite different. The explanation of dark energy is a
central preoccupation of present day cosmology. Its presence is indicated by the
recent speeding up of the expansion of the universe as shown by the supernova
observations discussed at this meeting, and is confirmed by other observations
such as those of the cosmic background radiation anisotropies and LSS/BAO
studies. Like dark matter, its existence was discovered, not predicted.
As discussed at this meeting, astronomical observations are being refined in
many sophisticated ways and used to confirm the acceleration and test equations
of state of hypothetical dark energy. However the interpretation of these obser-
vations is ambiguous, as discussed in section 4. It is therefore crucial to pursue
the possibility of any other tests on the one hand, and theoretical explanations
on the other. So how can we confirm its existence and nature?
2.1 Lab tests of Dark energy?
It is striking that at this meeting there are many proposals for laboratory or
accelerator detection of dark matter, but none for dark energy. Indeed such
tests in a lab or even the solar system are not feasible, in the case of the usual
conception of DE as cosmological constant or quintessence; it simply has no
significant effect at the relevant scales. The exception would be in the case of
unified approaches to Dark Energy and Dark Matter, as sometimes discussed.
Such approaches need to be explored: they may be facets of the same prob-
lem, and then evidence for dark matter is also evidence for dark energy. But
then we would have a force that would change (with scale) from attraction to
repulsion: we would have to explain why and how, and propose how to test
that change. The lab tests for dark matter would not explore the scales where
it would become effective dark energy. It seems unlikely one would attain the
required evidence for the dark energy effect.
2.2 Theoretical explanations?
Without lab tests, we have to rely on theoretical explanations for its nature.
However that nature (whether constant, or varying) is a major problem for
theoretical physics. It is not uniquely related to any known field or particles.
If the dark energy is in fact constant, the attempt to explain it from funda-
mental physics is a disaster — theoretical proposals for a cosmological constant
from quantum field theory give an answer 10120 factors too large! The only way
out seems to be the multiverse proposal, which is gaining ground, but is rather
problematic as a scientific explanation, as discussed in section 3.
If it is varying, a quintessence field, we need to know its nature; but no com-
pelling identification has been made. Perhaps it is due to modified gravitational
theories: higher curvature terms or effects of higher dimensions. Perhaps it is
due to some physical effect such as Bose-Einstein condensation; such options
need to be explored. We can just deal with it at a phenomenological level in
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terms of an arbitrary equation of state; but not all such equations of state are
physically acceptable, as discussed in Section 5.4, and in any case that approach
is not in the end satisfactory: ultimately it needs an underlying physical basis.
In all cases, the issue is how do we test these theoretical proposals? Many
seem very arbitrary. Just writing down a Lagrangian does not prove such matter
exists! If the explanation only explains one thing (the observed acceleration) and
has no other testable outcome, it is an ad hoc explanation for that one thing
rather than a unifying scientific proposal. It needs some other independent
experimental or observational test but we don’t have another viable context for
applying such tests.
So how do we justify our proposed theoretical explanations? Why this form
of quintessence? Why a cosmological constant with the observed value? We
need to see if there are any alternatives; and there are, as discussed below.
3 Explaining the cosmological constant via a mul-
tiverse
The idea of a multiverse – an ensemble of universes or of universe domains has
received increasing attention in cosmology (see the articles in Carr [6] for an up
to date survey), with suggestions including that it can occur
- in separate places, as particularly justified by chaotic inflation (Linde [21,
20], Guth [15, 16], Vilenkin [30])
- through the Everett quantum theory interpretation: other branches of the
wavefunction of the universe (Deutsch [11])
- because of the landscape of string theory, imbedded in a chaotic cosmology
(Susskind [26]).
A particular theoretical driver of these proposals is the ”anthropic” issue : the
realization that the universe is fine-tuned for life as regards both the laws of
physics and as regards the boundary conditions of the universe (Barrow and
Tipler [2], Rees [24, 25]). A multiverse with varied local physical properties is
one possible scientific explanation: an infinite set of universe domains allows
all possibilities to occur, so somewhere things work out OK: conditions for
life will be fulfilled somewhere in the multiverse (NB: it must be an actually
existing multiverse rather than a hypothetical one - this is essential for any such
anthropic argument).
The application of this proposal is to explaining fundamental constants, and
particularly explaining the small value of the cosmological constant (Weinberg
[31, 32], Susskind [26]). Too large a value for Λ results in no structure and
hence no life; so anthropic considerations in a multiverse mean that the value of
Λ observed by any intelligent being will be small (in fundamental units), thus
justifying an actual value extremely different from the ‘natural’ one predicted
by physics: a difference of 120 orders of magnitude. This makes clear the true
multiverse project: making the extremely improbable appear probable.
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However the very nature of the scientific enterprise is at stake in the multi-
verse debate: the multiverse proponents are proposing weakening the nature of
scientific proof in order to claim that multiverses provide a scientific explana-
tion. This is a dangerous tactic (note that we are concerned with really existing
multiverses, not potential or hypothetical). Two central scientific virtues are
testability and explanatory power. In the cosmological context, these are often
in conflict with each other (Ellis [12]). The extreme case is multiverse propos-
als, where no direct observational tests of the hypothesis are possible, as the
supposed other universes cannot be seen by any observations whatever, and the
assumed underlying physics is also untested and indeed probably untestable.
In this context one must re-evaluate what the core of science is: can one
maintain one has a genuine scientific theory when direct and indeed indirect
tests of the theory are impossible? If one claims this, one is altering what one
means by science. One should be very careful before so doing. The key obser-
vational point is that the domains considered are beyond the particle horizon
and are therefore unobservable. The assumption is we that can extrapolate to
100 Hubble radii, 101000 Hubble radii, or much much more (infinity is often
mentioned); but we have no data whatever about these domains. Given this
extremely poor observational context, are there other reasons to believe the
multiverse proposal?
Is it implied by known physics, that leads to chaotic inflation?
The key physics (Coleman-de Luccia tunneling, the string theory landscape) is
extrapolated from known and tested physics to new contexts; the extrapolation
is unverified and indeed is unverifiable; it may or may not be true. The physics
is hypothetical rather than tested. Is the situation:
Known Physics ⇒ Multiverse ??
NO! The real situation is
Known Physics ⇒ ? Hypothetical Physics ⇒ Multiverse
It is a great extrapolation from known physics. This extrapolation is untested,
and may be untestable: it may or may not be correct.
Is it Implied by inflation, which is justified by CBR anisotropy observations?
It is implied by some forms of inflation but not others; inflation is not yet a
well defined theory, it is a family of theories. Not all forms of inflation lead to
chaotic inflation, for example inflation can occur in small closed universes.
Is it implied by probability arguments?
It is claimed it is implied by a probability argument: the universe is no more
special than need be to create life. Hence the observed value of the Cosmological
constant is confirmation (Weinberg [31, 32]; Rees [24, 25]). But the statistical
argument only applies if a multiverse exists; it is simply inapplicable if there
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is no multiverse. In that case we only have one object we can observe; we can
do many observations of that one object, but it is still only one object (one
universe), and you can’t do statistical tests if there is only one existent entity
(Ellis [12]). Furthermore, we don’t know the measure to use; but the result
depends critically on this choice. Overall, this is a weak consistency test on
multiverses, that is indicative but not conclusive, firstly because a probability
argument cannot in fact be falsified, all it can do is confirm that some result
is improbable; and secondly, because while consistency tests must be satisfied,
they are not confirmation unless no other explanation is possible.
Is it testable through predicting closed spatial sections?
The claim is made (Susskind [26]) that only negatively curved RW models can
emerge in a chaotic inflation multiverse, because Coleman-de Luccia tunneling
only gives such models; so one can disprove chaotic inflation if one observation-
ally determines that k = +1. But that claim about inflation is already disputed,
as there are papers suggesting k = +1 tunneling is possible. In any case this
model it depends on a very specific speculative mechanism, which has not been
verified to actually work, and indeed such verification is probably impossible.
Alternatively one can claim the idea is disproved if we determine the spatial
sections are positively curved in the observed region, for then if they extend un-
changed far enough this implies a closed universe and hence no chaotic inflation.
But we could live in high density lump imbedded in a low density universe: the
extrapolation of k = +1 geometry beyond the visual horizon may not be valid.
Neither argument is conclusive!
However, chaotic inflation can be disproved if we observationally prove we
live in a small universe: that is, we have already seen round the universe be-
cause it has small closed spatial sections. To test for this possibility we can
search for identical circles in the CBR sky, plus a low CBR anisotropy power at
large angular scales (which is what is observed) – see Frank Steiner’s contribu-
tion. This is an important test as it would indeed disprove the chaotic inflation
variety of multiverse; but not seeing them would not prove a multiverse exists.
Their non-existence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a multiverse.
Is it theoretically preferable to other explanations of the way things are?
This is what many are claiming. Indeed the real argument for the proposal
is that it is the only purely physical explanation for fine tuning of parameters
that lead to our existence, in particular the value of the cosmological constant;
but this is theoretical explanation, not supported by astronomical observation.
So which is more important in cosmology: theory (explanation) or observations
(tests against reality)? That is the core issue to be faced.
Is it an infinity of entities necessarily implied?
Often it is claimed there are physically existing infinities both of universes
in a multiverse, and of spatial sections in each of the universes in the multiverse
context, see e.g. Vilenkin [30]. But infinity is an unattainable state rather than
a number, and is plausibly never attained in physical reality. Indeed David
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Hilbert states ”the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, no matter what
experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to” (Hilbert [17]). Fur-
thermore, this claim is completely untestable: if we could see them, which we
can’t, we could not count them in a finite time! The claimed existence of phys-
ically existing infinities is highly dubious, and is not a scientific statement, if
science involves testability by either observation or experiment. This claim in
the multiverse context emphasizes how tenuously scientific that idea is. It is not
remotely testable.
Implication of all the above:
The multiverse idea is not provable either by observation, or as an implication
of well established physics (cf. Gardner [13]). It may be true, but cannot be
shown to be true by observation or experiment. However it does have great
explanatory power: it does provide an empirically based rationalization for fine
tuning, developing from known physical principles. Here one must distinguish
between explanation and prediction. Successful scientific theories make predic-
tions, which can then be tested. The multiverse theory can’t make any predic-
tions because it can explain anything at all. Any theory that is so flexible is
not testable because almost any observation can be accommodated. I conclude
that multiverse proposals are good empirically-based philosophical proposals
for the nature of what exists, but are not strictly within the domain of science
because they are not testable. I emphasize that there is nothing wrong with
empirically-based philosophical explanation, indeed it is of great value, provided
it is labeled for what it is. I suggest that cosmologists should be very careful
not to make methodological proposals that erode the essential nature of science
in their enthusiasm to support such theories as being scientific (cf. Tegmark
[27, 28]), for if they do so, there will very likely be unintended consequences
in other areas where the boundaries of science are in dispute. It is dangerous
to weaken the grounds of scientific proof in order to include multiverses under
the mantle of ‘tested science’ for there are many other theories standing in the
wings that would also like to claim that mantle.
4 Inhomogeneity and the Acceleration of the
universe
The deduction of the existence of dark energy is based on the assumption that
the universe has a Robertson-Walker (RW) geometry - spatially homogeneous
and isotropic on a large scale. The observations can at least in principle be
accounted for without the presence of any dark energy, if we consider the possi-
bility of inhomogeneity. This can happen in two ways: locally via backreaction
and observational effects, and via large scale inhomogeneity.
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4.1 Small scale inhomogeneity: backreaction and obser-
vational effects
Acceleration due to back reaction from small scale inhomogeneities is discussed
by Wiltshire at this meeting (see also Wiltshire [33], Buchert [4]). Wiltshire
proposes that gravitational energy can provide a source of effective dark energy,
leading to the possibility in principle of concordance cosmology without Λ. It
is important to notice there are two effects here: firstly the backreaction from
small scale inhomogeneity to the large scale geometry can generate a dynamic
effect in the effective Friedmann equation for the cosmology, and secondly small
scale inhomogeneity has significant effects on the propagation of photons in a
lumpy universe, with potentially important effects on observations.
Whether these effects are sufficient to account for the apparent supernova
observations is an important ongoing debate involving interesting modeling and
general relativity issues, and particularly how one models a universe with large
scale voids and the nature of the Newtonian limit in cosmology. In my view the
jury is still out on this one, with many skeptical there is any significant effect and
others suggesting it may be at least large enough to affect the cosmic relation
between energy densities and expansion that leads us to deduce the spatial
curvature is almost flat. Conceptual clarity on the modeling issues involved is
required.
4.2 Large scale inhomogeneity: inhomogeneous geometry
Perhaps there is a large scale inhomogeneity of the observable universe such
as that described by the Lemaˆıtre-Tolman-Bondi (LTB) pressure-free spheri-
cally symmetric models, and we are near the centre of a void. The idea that
such models can explain the supernova observations without any dark energy is
discussed by Cele´rie´r at this meeting (and see also Ce´le´rier [7]).
4.3 Can we fit the observations?
The LTB models have comoving coordinates
ds2 = −dt2 +B2(r, t) +A2(r, t)(dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2)
where
B2(r, t) = A′(r, t)2(1− k(r))−1
and the evolution equation is
(A˙/A)2 = F (r)/A3 + 8pGρΛ/3− k(r)/A2
with the energy density given by F ′(A′A2)−1 = 8pGρM .
There are two arbitrary functions of the spatial coordinate r: namely k(r)
(curvature) and F (r) (matter). This freedom enables us to fit the supernova
observations with no dark energy or other exotic physics (this is a theorem, see
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Mustapha et al [23]). One can also fit the CBR observations because they refer
to much larger values of r (see e.g. Alexander et al [1]). One should note here
that at least some of the observed CBR dipole can then arise because we are a
bit off-centre in the void, so one can re-evaluate the great attractor analysis in
this context and the alignment of the dipole and quadrupole. Nucleosynthesis
data can also be fitted; what is a bit more problematic is the BAO. The key
comment to make is that different scales are probed by different observations and
can in principle all be fitted by adjusting the free spatial functions at different
distances.
A typical observationally viable model is one in which we live roughly cen-
trally (within 10% of the central position) in a large void: a compensated un-
derdense region stretching to z ≃ 0.08 with δρ/ρ ≃ −0.4 and size 160/h Mpc to
250/h Mpc, a jump in the Hubble constant of about 1.20 at that distance, and
no dark energy or quintessence field (Biswas et al [3], Ishak et al [18], Yoo et al
[34]).
4.4 Large scale inhomogeneity: dynamic evolution?
Given we can fit the observations by such a model, can we find dynamics (in-
flation followed by a HBB era) that can lead to such a model? It has the same
basic dynamics as the standard model (evolution along individual world lines
governed by the Friedmann equation) but with distant dependent parameters.
Will inflation prevent it? This depends on the initial data, the amount of infla-
tion, and the details of the unknown inflaton. If we are allowed the usual tricks
of fiddling the inflationary potential and initial data, and adding in multiple
fields as desired, then there is sufficient flexibility that it should certainly be
possible.
4.5 Improbability
Many dismiss these models on probability grounds: It is improbable we are near
the centre of such a model. But there is always improbability in cosmology. We
can can shift it around, but it is always there. It might be in the nature of
a Robertson-Walker geometry (the old view), in the inflationary potential and
initial conditions (the current mainstream position), which specific universe do-
main we are in within a multiverse, or the spatial position in an inhomogeneous
universe (the present proposal). Note that we are competing with a probability
of 10−120 for Λ in a RW universe; we do not have to get very high probabili-
ties to outdo that improbability, which is what the multiverse proposal aims to
handle.
Three comments are in order. First, a key feature of cosmology is that there
is only one universe; and the very concept of probability does not apply to a
single object, even though we can make many measurements of that single object
to determine its detailed nature. Probability applies to the multiple measures
we can make of the single universe, but not to issues doing with the existence of
the universe itself (Ellis [12]). There is no physically realised ensemble to apply
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that probability to, unless a multiverse exists in physical reality which is not
proven, as discussed above: it’s a philosophical assumption. In essence, there
simply is no proof the universe is probable; that is a philosophical assumption,
which may not be true. The universe may be improbable!! Secondly, there is
no well-justified measure for any such probability proposal even if we ignore the
first problem. This is still an issue of debate.
And thirdly, a study by Linde et al [22] shows that (given a particular
choice of measure) this kind of inhomogeneity actually is a probable outcome of
inflationary theory, with ourselves being located near the centre! One cannot
dismiss such models out of hand for probability reasons.
5 Observational tests of spatial homogeneity
Given the above context, direct observational tests of the Copernican(spatial
homogeneity) assumption are of considerable importance. Given that we can
both find inhomogeneous models to reproduce the observations without any
exotic energy, as well as homogeneous models with some form of dark energy
that explain the same observations, can we distinguish between the two? Ideally
we need a model-independent test: is a RW geometry the correct metric for
the observed universe region? Four kinds of tests are possible, as discussed
below. Whatever position we may have on the issue of probability, in the end
our philosophy on this question will have to give way to any such possible
observational tests.
5.1 CBR based tests
Some tests use scattered CBR photons to check spatial homogeneity (Goodman
[14]; Caldwell and Stebbins [5]). If the CBR radiation is anisotropic around
distant observers (as will be true in inhomogeneous models), Sunyaev-Zeldovich
scattered photons have a distorted spectrum that reflects the spatial inhomo-
geneity. However this test is somewhat model dependent - it is good for void
models but misses, e.g., conformally stationary spacetimes. It also has to take
into account other possible causes of spectral distortion.
5.2 Direct observational tests: behaviour near origin
The universe must not have a geometric cusp at the origin, as this implies a
singularity there. Thus there are centrality conditions that must be fulfilled
in the inhomogeneous models (Vanderveld et al [29]). The distance modulus
behaves as ∆dm(z) = −(5/2)q0z in standard ΛCDM models, but if this were
true in a LTB void model without Λ this implies a singularity (Clifton et al
[9]). Observational tests of this requirement will be available from intermediate
redshift supernovae in the future.
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5.3 Direct observational tests: constancy of curvature
There are two geometric effects on distance measurements: curvature Ωk bends
null geodesics, expansion H(z) changes radial distances. These are coupled in
RW models, as expressed in the relation
dL(z) =
(1 + z)
H0
√
−Ωk
sin
(√
−Ωk
∫ z
0
dz′
H0
H(z′)
)
.
While these effects are strictly coupled in RW geometries, they are decoupled
in LTB geometries.
In RW geometries, we can combine the Hubble rate and distance data to
find the curvature today:
Ωk =
[H(z)D′(z)]2 − 1
H0D(z)]2
This relation is independent of all other cosmological parameters, including dark
energy model and theory of gravity. It can be used at single redshift to determine
Ωk. The exciting result of Clarkson et al ([8]) is that since Ωk is independent
of z, we can differentiate to get the consistency relation
C(z) := 1 +H2(DD′′ −D′2) +HH ′DD′ = 0,
which depends only on a RW geometry: it is independent of curvature, dark
energy, nature of matter, and theory of gravity. Thus it gives the desired con-
sistency test for spatial homogeneity. In realistic models we should expect
C(z) ≃ 10−5, reflecting perturbations about the RW model related to struc-
ture formation. Errors may be estimated from a series expansion
C(z) =
[
q
(D)
0 − q
(H)
0
]
z +O(z2)
where q
(D)
0 is measured from distance data and q
(H)
0 from the Hubble parameter.
It is simplest to measure H(z) from BAO data. It is only as difficult carrying
out this test as carrying out dark energy measurements of w(z) from Hubble
data, which requires H ′(z) from distance measurements or the second derivative
D′′(z).
This is the simplest direct test of spatial homogeneity, and its implementa-
tion should be regarded as a high priority: for if it confirms spatial homogeneity,
that reinforces the evidence for the standard view in a satisfying way; but if it
does not, it has the possibility of undermining the entire project of searching
for a physical form of dark energy.
5.4 Indirect Observational tests
If the standard inverse analysis of the supernova data to determine the required
equation of state, as discussed at this meeting, shows there is any redshift range
where w := p/ρ < −1, this may well be a strong indication that one of these
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geometric explanations is preferable to the Copernican (Robertson-Walker) as-
sumption, for otherwise the matter model indicated by these observations is
non-physical (it has a negative kinetic energy).
There is already data suggesting this may be be the case, see e.g. Lima et
al [19]. There are some attempts to generate matter models that will give this
kind of behaviour without negative kinetic energies, but they are very specu-
lative physically, supposing multiple unknown forms of matter or energy with
arbitrarily proposed interactions between them. It all seems rather reminiscent
of the Ptolemaic epicycles for describing the solar system. The physically most
conservative approach is to assume no unusual dark energy or exotic interact-
ing fields, but rather that an inhomogeneous geometry might be responsible for
the observed apparent acceleration; this should be seriously considered as an
alternative.
6 Conclusion
The issue of what is testable and what is not testable in cosmology is a key issue.
Some dark energy proposals, specifically from multiverse advocates, propose
weakening the link to observational tests, because they believe we have such a
good theory that it must be right. But if a proposal is not testable, we certainly
need to consider observationally testable alternatives.
The acceleration indicated by supernova data could possibly be due to small
scale inhomogeneity that definitely exists, but may not be sufficiently significant
to do the job. It could be due to large scale inhomogeneity that can probably
do the job, but may not exist. Observational tests of the latter possibility are as
important as pursuing the dark energy (exotic physics) option in a homogeneous
universe. Theoretical prejudices as to the universe’s geometry, and our place in
it, must bow to such observational tests.
We should stand firm and insist that genuine science is based on observa-
tional testing of plausible hypotheses. There is nothing wrong with physically
motivated philosophical explanation: but it must be labeled for what it is. Over-
all: theory must be subject to experimental and/or observational test; this is
the central feature of science. There is good progress in this respect as regards
both dark matter and dark energy
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